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Abstract: 
Independent Committees in the US are more likely to be scrutinised by the courts than their 
counterpart Independent Advisers in the UK after or during mergers and acquisitions.   
Stockholders are more likely to bring actions against Committees in the US for unfairness in 
the transaction than shareholders may bring against Advisers.  Whilst the use of Independent 
Committees may clear boards of charges of unfairness in handling transactions, it cannot 
cure fraud.  This article considers the role of independent committees and advisers in 
Mergers and Acquisitions in light of the Delaware Court of Chancery case (Dole Foods Co 
Inc). 
 
KEY POINTS 
 
·     While in the US, the question of the independence of Committees or Advisers is decided 
through litigation in the courts, UK practice and law prevents such litigation. 
 
·      Both Delaware courts and the UK Takeover Panel are likely to find Committees or 
Advisers to be independent notwithstanding they have a connection or an advisory role with 
the offeror; the Panel’s approach has become more flexible as financial advisers and 
companies enter less exclusive relationships 
 
·      The judge in Dole reiterated a common law rule – fraud unravels all – in finding that an 
Independent Committee cannot cure fraudulent actions of the board in a merger transaction. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In mergers and acquisitions where management are interested, there is potential for conflict 
of interests if the same management board advise the shareholders on the merits of the 
proposal.  In the US, in order “to reduce the conflict of interest, directors often establish a 
special committee of disinterested directors to evaluate the management proposal” (Bill Shaw 
(1990) 19 Hofsra Law Review 143, 155).  The use of Independent Committees in such 
transactions has a long history, and the independence of such committees have been the 
subject of debate for a long time.  In the UK, managerial conflicts of interests in such 
transactions are unlikely to cause issues because the rules contained in the Code on Mergers 
and Takeovers prevent this by giving “almost complete authority to shareholders” (Armour 
and Skeel (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727, 1730).  The rules also require boards to 
take independent advice in giving their opinion to shareholders.  This article compares the 
role of Independent Committees (in the US) with that of Independent Advisers (in the UK). 
 
The role of Independent Advisers in the UK has not been much debated compared to the 
counterpart role of Independent Committees in the US.  Questions that have dominated the 
US debate have included what counts as independent, and what are the limits of such 
independence.  The judgment of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware in Re Dole 
Food Co Inc (Consolidated Nos 8703 and 9079 of 27 August 2015) reiterates the effect of 
fraud. 
 
This article proceeds as follows.  First, it compares the different regulatory approaches in the 
US and UK under which Committees  and Advisers  operate.  Second, it considers, in light of 
the Dole case, the following issues regarding the use of Independent Committees (US): what 
counts as independent; which decisions should the committee make and which should be 
passed back to the target’s board; and whether there are any steps committees can take to 
protect the company from aggressive bidders acting in bad faith.  Third, it discusses the role 
of Independent Advisers in the UK, noting particularly the unlikelihood of court scrutiny.  
The last section concludes. 
 
DIFFERENT REGULATORY APPROACHES 
 
It is worth providing a brief background to the rather different regulatory approaches in the 
UK and US, and the different powers that boards in the UK and US have during mergers or 
takeovers.  The difference in UK and US approaches is well explained in the seminal work of 
Armour and Skeel (2007 Georgetown Law Journal 95:1727).  In the UK, takeovers are 
governed by the Takeover Panel, which administers the rules in the Takeover Code.  In 
contrast, most takeovers in the US are governed by the courts of Delaware.  In the UK, the 
board is prohibited under the board neutrality rule (Code, rule 21) from frustrating a bid 
without shareholders’ approval.  In contrast, the board in the US may, without prior 
stockholders’ approval, take defensive measures to frustrate a bid, as long as the measures are 
a justifiable discharge of their fiduciary duties. 
 
The roles of a UK Independent Adviser and a US Independent Committee are also different.  
In the UK, the Independent Adviser advises the board, who in turn advises the shareholders, 
on the merits of the offer.  The board is required (Code, rule 25) to provide shareholders with 
a reasoned opinion on the merits of the offer, and the role of Independent Advisers is to assist 
the board in forming that reasoned opinion.  It is ultimately for the shareholders to decide on 
whether to accept or reject the offer.  In contrast, in the US, the Independent Committee is 
vested with board-like powers to negotiate the offer on behalf of either the stockholders (in 
management buyouts) or minority stockholders (in offers [*100] by controlling stockholders).  
With the UK Independent Advisers’ role being merely advisory, there is less potential for 
liability to shareholders. This is the converse for Independent Committees in the US, with 
stockholders more likely to bring action against them for unfairness in the transaction. 
 
With particular reference to Advisers, the US and UK approach to apportioning liability is 
likely to be the same.  In Re Dole Food Co Inc, the plaintiff sought to attach liability to 
Murdock’s financial Adviser, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc (“DBS”).  Although DBS acted 
improperly by favouring Murdock and treating him as the bank’s real client, even though 
DBS was representing Dole, the court found that DBS had not participated knowingly in the 
breaches that led to liability.  The same results were reached in Gesoff v IIC Industries Inc 
(Nos 19473 and 19600, Del Ch, May 18, 2006).  Here, a sole special committee member had 
violated his fiduciary duty of care in approving the merger, but had acted in good faith and 
had not derived an improper personal benefit.  He was not liable mainly because he was kept 
unaware of key facts that made the merger process unfair from a procedural point of view. 
 
If the Dole situation was to be decided in the UK, DBS would first need to be considered as 
an Independent Adviser.  In the UK, “a prospective adviser to an offeree company might not 
be considered sufficiently independent, for example, if it has had a recent advisory role with 
the offeror or has a very close advisory relationship with a large shareholder in the offeree 
company” (Takeover Panel, Annual Report 1995).  Advisers may still be independent 
notwithstanding their close relationship (Practice Statement, 7 March 2008).  Where matters 
that would attract liability hinge on the independence of Advisers, these are dealt with at the 
early stages through consultation with the Takeover Panel.  Given the process, it is unlikely 
that the Dole situation in reference to Advisers’ liability would be an issue in the UK. 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF INDEPENDENT COMMITTEES 
 
In the US, the function of independent advisers in mergers and acquisitions is assigned to 
Special Committees.  The use of Special Committees was recommended by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Weinberger v UOP Inc (457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)), where in finding that 
the parent-subsidiary merger was unfair to the subsidiary’s minority stockholders, the court 
opined that the defendants’ claim of fair dealing would have been enhanced by use of “an 
independent negotiating committee of outside directors.” 
 
There are no fast and hard rules to having Special Committees.  Usually, Special Committees 
are appointed where the bidder is an insider or major or controlling stockholder of the target 
company.  The role of Special Committees is to help the board overcome potential for 
conflict of interests.   To promote the independence of Special Committees, the practice is to 
have persons who are not on the board and not nominees of the bidder.  But the independence 
of Special Committees may remain intact notwithstanding it is currently connected or had a 
recent connection with the offeror, as was the case in Dole (below). 
 
The courts have stated that determining “the composition of the special committee is of 
central importance” and should be approached conscientiously and with a view to minimising 
risk (Gesoff v IIC Indus Inc (902 A.2d 1130, 1145-1146 (Del. Ch. 2006).  What counts as 
independent includes the following: disinterested members; no conflicts of interests; no 
benefit to be gained from a certain outcome; and must give due care.  Whether a person is 
independent and disinterested should be tested at the outset and continuously monitored. 
Testing can include questionnaire or in-person/telephonic interviews.  However, the 
Committee as a whole may be regarded independent even though some members are 
interested.  This was the case in Dole (below) where the Committee was found to be 
independent even though the Committee Chair was well connected to the offeror. 
 
But how independent should the Independent or Special Committee be?  In Delaware, an 
earlier view, albeit directed at litigation committees, suggested that Special Committees 
“should, like Caesar’s wife, be above reproach” (Lewis v Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1985).  To be above reproach, independent advisers must be at arm’s length with the 
controlling party. 
 
“Independence means that a director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject 
before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences” (Aronson v Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)).  A director lacks independence if they are “beholden” to the interested 
party or interested director(s), or is so under such party’s or person’s influence that the 
director’s “discretion would be sterilised” (Rales v Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 
1993)). 
 
Independent Committees make a number of decisions including: evaluating the bid (value of 
the company, fairness of the bid, and long term plans of the company); negotiating the bid; 
defending against an unwanted takeover; and appointing independent legal and financial 
advisors.  When decisions should be passed back to the board will depend on the special facts 
of each case.  It may depend on the level of the conflict of interests of the board of directors 
in the particular transaction.  It may depend on the expertise and knowledge of the 
Committee.  However, if the use of a Special Committee in the first place is to avoid potential 
conflicts of interests of the board, it follows that it is best that the Committee makes all the 
decisions. 
 
There should be demonstrable independence, otherwise dissatisfied stockholders may 
challenge the transaction as unfair.  In Kahn v Lynch Communication Systems Inc, the 
Delaware Supreme Court opined that where the transaction is approved by a committee of 
independent disinterested directors, there is a presumption that the transaction was fair, and it 
is for stockholders who challenge the fairness to prove otherwise (638 A.2d 1110 (1994)). 
 
Considering that Independent or Special Committees make decisions in place of the board, 
the Committee can be sued by stockholders and the court would review the transaction.  It 
was stated in Emerald Partners v Berlin (787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del. 2001)), that where, after a 
stocks transaction, stockholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of 
three standards of judicial review is applied: (i) the traditional business judgment rule, (ii) an 
intermediate [*101] standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or (iii) the entire fairness analysis. 
 
The business judgment rule is a presumption that “in making a business decision the directors 
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company” (Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984) – overruled on other grounds by Brehm v Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2009)).  The 
business judgement rule is applied if there is evidence that the directors advising on a 
transaction were disinterested and independent.  Otherwise an intermediate or entire fairness 
review is applied. 
 
In the UK, the closest principle to the business judgment rule is the director’s duty to 
“exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider – not what a court may consider – is 
in the interests of the company” (Re Smith & Fawcett [1942] Ch 304 per Lord Greene).  But 
in mergers and acquisitions in the UK, especially in takeovers, we are not per se looking at 
the interests of the company, but rather those of the shareholders.  This is because of the way 
in which the Code applies..  As to the intermediate or entire fairness review in the US, this 
would equate to  judicial review in the UK.  In Datafin, (see below) however the courts held 
that judicial review of the Panel’s decisions is to be historical rather than contemporaneous. 
 
But the use of Independent Committees continues to raise questions.  Dole raises the question 
of what steps Committees may take to protect the company from aggressive bidders acting in 
bad faith.  It also reiterates the limits of Independent Committees when fraud is involved. 
 
In Re Dole Food Co Inc, stockholders alleged that the transaction was unfair, and the court 
found in their favour.  David Murdock owned 40% of Dole’s shares, he was its Chairman and 
CEO and de factor controller.  He paid in November 2013 $13.50 per share for the remaining 
shares in Dole.  Murdock initially offered $12 per share; and he conditioned the offer on 
approval by disinterested and independent directors (the “Committee”).  In the stockholders 
litigation, the independence of the Committee was questioned.  The Committee was made up 
of four: Conrad, Chao, Dickson, and Lansing – of these, Conrad was the Committee Chair, 
and had a long history of entanglements with Murdock.  Yet, Vice Chancellor Laster found 
Conrad to be independent after hearing his testimonies.  The court found that the committee 
had acted with integrity and independence.  The Committee negotiated the increase from $12 
to $13.50 per share, which was judged as a fair price. 
 
As to the question of what a Committee can do about an aggressive bidder, such as Murdock, 
in some cases the Independent Committee might never be able to take enough steps to avoid 
an aggressive bidder, especially in cases such as Dole where the management gave false 
information to the Committee and acted fraudulently.  If the bidder is not a controlling 
shareholder (or is not providing false information) then the Committee can take steps to 
advise on how best to defend the company (using post bid defences) and also help the 
management to meet the standards under the business judgment rule. 
 
Dole also dealt with allegations of fraud.  The facts show that, Murdock, through his right-
hand man, Michael Carter, made false disclosure about savings Dole could realise after 
selling approximately half of its business.  Carter provided the Committee with lowball 
management projections.  The next day, in a secret meeting that violated the procedures 
established by the Committee, Carter gave Murdock’s advisors and financing banks more 
positive and accurate data.  Vice Chancellor Laster stated that, “what the Committee could 
not overcome, what the stockholder vote could not cleanse, and what even an arguably fair 
price does not immunize, is fraud;” and “Murdock and Carter deprived the Committee of the 
ability to negotiate on a fully informed basis and potentially say no to the Merger” (at 2-3). 
 
On the effect of fraud, Vice Chancellor Laster reiterated a common law rule – fraud unravels 
everything.  He found that “Carter engaged in fraud.”   He then said, “According to the 
common law nostrum, fraus omnia corrumpit – fraud vitiates everything. Here it rendered 
useless and ineffective the highly commendable efforts of the Committee and its advisors to 
negotiate a fair transaction that they subjectively believed was in the best interests of Dole’s 
stockholders” (at 58).  This rule can be traced back to a famous dictum of Denning LJ in the 
UK decision Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley, where he stated: “No court in this land will allow 
a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no 
order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels 
everything” ([1956] 1 QB 702, 712).  In HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase 
Manhattan Bank, Lord Bingham reiterated the rule, “fraud is a thing apart. This is not a mere 
slogan. It reflects an old legal rule that fraud unravels all: fraus omnia corrumpit. It also 
reflects the practical basis of commercial intercourse. Once fraud is proved, ‘it vitiates 
judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever’” ([2003] UKHL 6, 15). 
 
Dole demonstrates that there is almost nothing an Independent Committee can do against 
fraud.  The advice of Independent Committees is only as good as the information disclosed to 
them by the management of the company.  Whilst the use of Independent Committees may 
clear boards of charges of unfairness in handling transactions, it cannot cure fraud.  Yet, as 
long as Independent Committees remain unaware of undisclosed material information and are 
not involved in the fraud, their independence is likely to remain intact, as was the case in 
Dole. 
 INDEPENDENCE OF INDEPENDENT ADVISERS 
 
In the UK, Rule 3.1 of the Code requires that the board of the offeree company must obtain 
competent independent advice as to whether the financial terms of any offer are fair and 
reasonable, and must make the substance of such advice known to its shareholders.  In all 
cases, but especially in management buyouts or offers by controlling shareholders, the Panel 
stresses the independence of Independent Advisers.  The Panel stresses that in such cases, “it 
is particularly important that the independence of the adviser is beyond question” (Code, 
Note 1 on Rule 3.1).  In determining whether an Adviser is independent, the [*102] Panel 
examines the strength of the overall relationship between the offeror and the adviser and its 
group (Takeover Panel, Practice Statement 21, issued 7 March 2008). 
 
The general approach of the Panel to the question of independence is not to apply settled 
strict rules as to what is independent, but to be flexible in reviewing all material facts of each 
case.  The mischief to be avoided is conflict of interests, and the Panel must be satisfied that 
the Adviser’s loyalty to the offeror does not conflict with their duty to provide the offeree 
with independent advice.  The Panel will investigate all matters relevant to determining such 
independence.  The Panel has always been at pains to stress the importance of early 
consultation where the independence of the Independent Adviser is likely to be questioned. 
 
What will count as independent is a matter of fact finding on a case by case examination 
taking into account the changing circumstances.  In 1995, the Panel was of the view that an 
Adviser, who has had a recent advisory role with the offeror or has a very close advisory 
relationship with a large shareholder in the offeree, would not be regarded as sufficiently 
independent (Takeover Panel, Annual Statement 1995).  In the offer by Abbey National (as 
the offeror) for Cater Allen (as the offeree), the Panel ruled that Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, 
due to its “close, recent and continuing” advisory relationship with the offeror, would not be 
sufficiently independent to advise in the transaction (Takeover Panel, Annual Statement 
1997).  This approach has since been relaxed in light of changing circumstances.  In 2008, the 
Panel was of the view that relationships between financial advisers and companies are in 
many cases less exclusive than was previously the case, and therefore concluded that it 
should be more flexible in its approach in determining the independence of an Adviser 
(Practice Statement, 7 March 2008).  Examining all material information, the Panel is more 
likely than in the past to conclude that an Adviser is independent notwithstanding that it is 
currently advising, or had a recent advisory role with the offeror.  Early consultation with the 
Panel remains paramount for parties. 
 
It is unlikely that it would be open to parties in the UK to challenge the independence of 
Independent Advisers in court (in a few cases such as in Marks & Spencer Group Plc v 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer [2004] EWCA Civ 741, issues have not turned on the 
independence of Advisers per se – in this case the issue of Freshfields’ conflict of interest 
arose because it was acting for the bidder, rather than as Independent Adviser to the target).  
Compared to the US, Independent Committees are more likely to be scrutinised by the courts 
than their counterpart Independent Advisers in the UK.  Issues arising out of takeover bids 
are resolved by the Panel, and the courts have historically been reluctant to intervene.  The 
overarching reason for courts’ reluctance is to dissuade parties from using tactical litigation 
to frustrate a takeover bid.  That this is so is confirmed by Lord Denning MR’s comment “the 
very moving for an injunction” is regarded by the courts as “an action designed to frustrate 
the making of the bid” (Dunford & Elliot Ltd v Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd [1977] Lloyd’s 
Law Reports 505, 510). 
 
In the landmark case of Datafin, the Court of Appeal ruled that the courts’ relationship with 
the Panel is “to be historical rather than contemporaneous” – the courts would allow the 
Panel’s “contemporary decisions to take their course, considering the complaint and 
intervening, if at all, later and in retrospect by declaratory orders which would enable the 
Panel not to repeat any error” (R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex part Datafin plc 
[1987] QB 815, 842).  Courts in the UK have long left takeover issues to be resolved by the 
Panel.  In Re Piccadilly Radio plc, refusing the bidder’s request for an injunction, the court 
was dismayed at the “regrettable tendency for the contestants in modern takeover battles to 
try to enlist the aid of the court” ((1989) 5 BCC 692, 706 per Millett J). 
 
The practice of the Panel minimises the potential for the lack of independence of Advisers to 
adversely affect takeovers.  The Panel proactively seeks to ensure that the independence of 
Advisers is beyond question.  The Panel “strongly recommends early consultation with the 
Executive in any case where the independence of an adviser could be in doubt” (Takeover 
Panel, Annual Report 1995). 
 
The statutory regime makes it very unlikely that parties would go to court to challenge the 
independence of Advisers.  The Companies Act 2006 (“CA”) gives the Panel powers to deal 
with all issues in takeover bids: the Panel’s decisions are legally binding, and the Panel can 
make directions that must be complied with (CA ss 945, 946); a party not satisfied with the 
Panel’s Executive decision may appeal to the Panel’s Hearing Committee (CA s 951(1)); and 
if a party is still dissatisfied, they may further appeal to the Panel’s Appeal Board (CA s 
951(3)). 
 
The foregoing suggests that, in the UK, whether an Independent Adviser is sufficiently 
independent, is a matter of fact for the Panel to decide on a case by case basis.  In practice, 
early consultation and flexibility of the Panel makes it easy for parties to seek guidance on 
the question of independence of prospective Advisers.  The UK legal regime empowers the 
Panel to deal with these issues and saves parties from expensive litigation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has compared the use of Independent Committees in the US and Independent 
Advisers in the UK.  The former have extensive roles in advising and negotiating 
transactions.  With that greater role comes a higher risk of liability for unfairness in handling 
or advising the transaction with the result that US takeovers are more likely to be scrutinised 
by the courts.  
 
In the UK, the Panel’s more relaxed approach to the question of independence in the context 
of the relationship between financial advisers and the companies they advise, should give 
greater comfort to banks and financial institutions advising on M&A. 
